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Measuring Merit in Rhode Island's
Natural Experiment in Judicial
Selection
Mirya R. Holman, Ph.D.*
INTRODUCTION
Rhode Island's decision to change the method by which the
State selects its Supreme Court justices has provided the world of
judicial behavior with an exciting natural experiment: a way to
examine whether changing the selection method for judges does,
in fact, matter. Proponents of a particular kind of selection
method - whether it be partisan election, merit selection,
appointment, or non-partisan election - argue that their preferred
selection method will produce a court with "better" judges. 1 In the
case of Rhode Island, a series of scandals involving Supreme Court
justices resulted in a move to alter the selection process from one
involving the Grand Committee to a less partisan process by
which the justices would be selected based on merit.2 Those
* Mirya R. Holman is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Florida
Atlantic University. The author would like to extend her thanks to Hala
Furst and Andrew Redman for research assistance, to Michael Yelnosky for
the invitation to present and for providing essential pieces of information,
and to Mitu Gulati, Stephen Choi, and Eric Posner for use of their data and
methods.
1. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection
Debate and Why it Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICs 1259, 1269-77 (2008) (summarizing the arguments for various
methods of judicial selection); Madison B. McClellan, Merit Appointment
Versus Popular Election: A Reformer's Guide to Judicial Selection Methods in
Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 529, 557-59 (1991) (advocating for judicial elections).
2. Mark A. Behrens and Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting
Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 310 (2002); Barton P. Jenks, III, Rhode Island's New
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advocating for the change of selection method argued that the
change would result in better justices. 3 But has the change
actually resulted in these changes? To answer this question, I will
present a series of measures of judicial quality that were
developed by Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner.
Specifically, I will present information on the production,
influence, expertise, verbosity, and independence for Rhode Island
Supreme Court justices selected prior to the selection change
(those on the Court from 1989 to 1991), a group of justices split
between those selected prior to the change and those selected post-
change (1998 to 2000), and a collection of justices selected entirely
by the merit selection method (2005 to 2007).
I. MEASURES
The dataset used in this paper is based on several interesting
pieces of information about Supreme Court justices on the Rhode
Island Supreme Court. The paper looks at three specific sets of
justices on the Supreme Court: first, a group of justices
(specifically Fay, Kelleher, Weisberger, Murray, Shea) who served
on the Court from 1989 to 1991, which was prior to the selection
method change. The remainder of the paper will refer to these
justices as the "pre-merit" or the "early group" of justices. The
second period examined is from 1998 to 2000 and includes Justices
Bourcier, Flanders, Goldberg, Lederberg, and Weisberger. 4 In the
Judicial Merit Selection Law, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 63 (1996);
Michael J. Yelnosky, Rhode Island's Judicial Nominating Commission: Can
"Reform" Become Reality?, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 87 (1996); Russell
Garland, R.I. Changes the Method of Selecting its Judges: A Panel will
Propose Candidates to the Governor, who will Make the Selection,
PROVIDENCE J., June 3, 1994, at Al [hereinafter R.. Changes the Method of
Selecting its Judges]; Joseph A. Bevilacqua Dies at 70; Rhode Island Judge
Linked to Mob, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1989, at D23 [hereinafter Bevilacqua
Dies at 70]; Russell Garland, Board Censures Bevilacqua for 'Disrepute to
Judiciary'; Chief Justice Agrees to Take 4-Month Unpaid Suspension,
PROVIDENCE J., June 22, 1985, at Al [hereinafter Board Censures
Bevilacqua].
3. See Wayne Miller, RIght Now! Urges Reform in Choosing Judges;
Cronyism, the Group Says, Must Forever be Removed from the Process,
PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 27, 1993, at A8. As Barton P. Jenks articulates,
"Although the new judicial selection procedure is flawed, it unquestionably is
an improvement over its predecessor." Jenks, supra note 2, at 65.
4. The data on this period comes, with permission, from: Stephen J.
Choi et al., Judicial Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking the State
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paper, this Court is referred to as the "hybrid Court" or the "mid
Court" (as it contains justices selected for the court from both
before and after the merit change). The final period of analysis is
from 2005 to 2007 and includes Justices Williams, Goldberg,
Flaherty, Robinson, and Suttell. This period will be referred to as
the "post-merit" or 'later period" for the remainder of the paper.
For each of these justices, data was collected on multiple
measures, including: (1) the number of published opinions; (2) the
numbers of citations from outside the state (that is, non-precedent
driven citations); (3) the number of citations from outside Rhode
Island's federal district; (4) the length of opinions; (5) the subject
matter of the opinions; and (6) the amount of open disagreements
(dissenting opinions) between justices with the same political
background. These measures are based on a significant body of
research.5 There are alternate measures that have been proposed
by those that question the usefulness and validity of these
measures.6 However, for this research, I will leave the debate to
other scholars. While these measures are certainly imperfect,
they should produce equal levels of bias and variance, regardless
of the year examined. Essentially, I assume that any
inadequacies of these measures are not the result of the year of
measurement, so looking year to year will allow me to engage in a
reasonable comparison.
High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313 (2009) [hereinafter
Judicial Evaluations].
5. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical
Response to the Judicial Salary Debate, 1 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 47 (2009)
[hereinafter Are Judges Overpaid?]; Choi et al., Judicial Evaluations, supra
note 4; Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians? The Uncertain
Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, J. OF L.
ECON. AND ORG. (forthcoming), available at
http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/ewn023v1 [hereinafter
Professionals or Politicians?]; Stephen J. Choi et al., Judging Women, 2010,
(working paper), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1479724 [hereinafter
Judging Women].
6. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross,& Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges 58
DUKE L.J. 1383 (2009); Scott Baker, Adam Feibelman, and William P.
Marshall, Special Symposium Issue Measuring Judges And Justice: Response:
The Continuing Search For A Meaningful Model Of Judicial Rankings And
Why It (Unfortunately) Matters, 58 DUKE L.J. 1645 (2009); Laura Denvir
Stith, Response, Just Because You Can Measure Something, Does It Really
Count?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1743, 1748 (2009).
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1. Publication Rates
Those looking to measure judicial quality have often turned to
the published opinion as the base for such measures;7 the
published judicial opinion is, after all, the "heart of the common
law system."8 Previous research by Choi, Gulati and Posner has
argued that publishing an opinion is more work than issuing an
unpublished disposition.9 In addition, by publishing an opinion,
the authoring judge risks bringing greater external scrutiny, as
their attitudes and reasoning are more widely available. A judge
who publishes an opinion also is engaging in an act that benefits
the system, as a published opinion represents an attempt by the
judge to share his/her reasoning with the parties and with others
who seek to understand the resolution of the dispute.10 Further,
the publication of an opinion gives it greater precedential weight.
As such, there are two possible competing hypotheses that might
be generated by the data examined here. First, an observer might
contend that the merit selection process should bring a higher
quality of justice to the bench than was previously selected
through the Grand Committee, which was notoriously partisan.11
If this is so, the expectation should be that the justices selected
under the merit system would be selected for meritorious reasons,
not partisan grounds. Thus, these judges may be "better" at their
7. See Choi et. al., Are Judges Overpaid?, supra note 5; Choi et al.,
Judicial Evaluations, supra note 4, at 1319-20; Choi et al., Professionals or
Politicians?, supra note 5; Ahmed E. Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of
How Judges Allocate Their Time, 6 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 1, 4 (2004); Martha J.
Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if they Publish? Or Does
the Declining use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a
Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 758-59 (1995); Richard A. Posner,
What do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else
Does), 3 SUP. CT. EcoN. REV. 1, 7 (1993) [hereinafter What do Judges and
Justices Maximize?].
8. See John Reid, Doe Did Not Sit: The Creation of Opinions by an
Artist, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 59 (1963).
9. See Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians?, supra note 5.
10. See Taha, supra note 6, at 4; Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication
of Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909 (1986); William L.
Reynolds and William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in
the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
573 (1981).
11. See Garland, RI. Changes the Method of Selecting its Justices, supra
note 2.
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jobs and more productive.
Hypothesis la: Justices Selected by Merit, Instead of by the Grand
Committee, will Publish more Opinions than Those Selected by
the Grand Committee.
Another possibility is that those justices selected for the
Supreme Court via the merit system may be more aware of the
public perception of their actions. 12 This may be especially true in
Rhode Island, where a series of scandals were the impetus behind
the change in selection methods. 13 As such, the justices on the
post-merit court may be less likely to publish opinions, as a
published opinion is more widely available (including to their
peers, the media, and the general public), thus subjecting their
decisions to scrutiny. Thus, it might be reasonable to expect that
post-merit courts will publish fewer opinions.
Hypothesis 1b: Justices Selected by Merit will Publish less
Opinions than Those Selected by the Grand Committee.
2. Citations
Looking next for a rough measure of influence, researchers
have commonly used citations by outside authorities. 14 There are
three sets of influence as measured by citations presented here: all
citations to majority opinions published by the state high court in
question from (1) other state courts; (2) federal courts (other than
the home federal circuit); and (3) secondary sources, such as law
reviews. Citation counts can be used to measure the quality of
12. See Jona Goldschmidt et al., The Relationship Between Method of
Judicial Selection and Judicial Misconduct, 18 WIDENER L. J. 455, 467-72
(analyzing the relationship between method of judicial selection and judicial
misconduct); Behrans and Silverman, supra note 2 (discussing the benefits of
a merit selection system).
13. See Garland, R.I. Changes the Method of Selecting its Judges, supra
note 2; Garland, Board Censures Bevilacqua, supra note 2; Bevilacqua Dies at
70, supra note 2.
14. See, e.g., Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid?, supra note 5; Choi et al.,
Judicial Evaluations, supra note 4; Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians?,
supra note 5; Choi et al., Judging Women, supra note 5; William M. Landes et
al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals
Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998).
2010] 709
710 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:705
analysis,15 nimbleness in writing,16 and creativity.17 If the extant
scholarship is accurate, I expect that the justices selected through
a non-partisan mechanism will be cited more often than those
justices from the early period. As compared to a court where
justices can be selected because of personal or political reasons, a
justice selected for reasons of merit should be producing opinions
of greater quality of analysis. Thus, I expect that justices on the
hybrid or post-merit Courts will have higher levels of citation than
the pre-merit Court.
Hypothesis 2: Justices Selected by Merit Selection will be Cited to
More Often - Regardless of the Measure of Citations - than
Justices Selected by the Grand Committee.
3. Length of Opinions
There are diverse opinions about what the page length of a
judicial opinion means. Generally, scholars who have examined
the length of opinions argue that a long opinion is indicative of the
amount of effort by the judge to justify her opinion in the case;
legitimacy is derived from explaining the reasoning behind the
opinion fully; i.e. "[h]e is right because he has satisfied us that his
judgment rests on good grounds."18  However, others have
suggested that a shorter opinion is more concise, and, as such, is
harder to write than a long opinion.19 Regardless of who is
correct, both sides - and many scholars - believe that page length
15. See Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid?, supra note 5; Choi et al.,
Judicial Evaluations, supra note 4; Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians?,
supra note 5.
16. See David C. Vladeck, Keeping Score: The Utility of Empirical
Measurements in Judicial Selection, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1415, 1432-33
(2005) (positing that particularly well-written judicial opinions are likely to
be frequently cited).
17. See Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An
Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1276-77 (2005) (suggesting
that creative judges are likely to be cited more often because they are more
often reversed).
18. Jean Louis Goutal, Characteristics of Judicial Style in France,
Britain, and the U.S.A., 24 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 43, 66 (1976). See also Posner,
What do Judges and Justices Maximize?, supra note 6; Francis A. Leach, The
Length of Judicial Opinions, 21 YALE L. J. 141 (1911).
19. See Goutal, supra note 18; IVichael Wells, French and American
Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 81 (1994); Reid, supra note 8.
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is an important measure of judicial effort.20 The disagreements in
expectations produce the possibility for conflicting hypotheses. 21
Hypothesis 3a: Justices Selected by the Merit System will Publish
Longer Opinions.
Hypothesis 3b: Justices Selected by the Merit System will Publish
Shorter Opinions.
4. Subject Areas
An additional area of judicial behavior that is quantifiable is
an evaluation of the most common subject areas in which judges
choose to publish. Choi, Gulati, and Posner developed fifteen
categories of the most common subject areas after conducting a
broad survey of the cases that were heard by state Supreme Court
justices. 22 Theoretically, there is reason to believe that a justice
selected by the merit system might be less likely to specialize in a
specific kind of case and would be more broadly trained than those
justices selected by the Grand Committee.
Hypothesis 4: Courts Comprised of Justices Selected by Merit
Selection will Publish on a more Diverse Group of Cases than
Courts with Justices Selected by the Grand Committee.
5. Disagreement
The fourth measure looks at the willingness of a judge to
disagree with co-partisans, either by dissenting from their
20. See Goutal, supra note 18; Wells, supra note 19; Leach, supra note
18.
21. Alternately, some suggest that the length of opinion holds little
meaning in the process of judging judges; some cases call for more
elaboration, while other opinions can be expresses succinctly. As such, there
is the possibility that the length of opinion will have no relationship at all
with the change in selection mechanism.
22. The subjects include administration, campaign finance, church and
state, criminal, environmental, business, first amendment, government,
courts, labor, other, private law, rights, property, tax, and torts. See Choi et
al., Are Judges Overpaid?, supra note 5; Choi et al., Professionals or
Politicians?, supra note 5; Choi et al., Judicial Evaluations, supra note 4, at
1323.
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opinions or writing majority opinions that induce dissents. 23 In
calculating this measure, I look at dissenting opinions, which are
open and public statements of disagreements. First, the number
of disagreements by a judge against co-partisans divided by the
total number of disagreements by the justice is examined, which
provides a rough idea as to how likely a judge is to agree or
disagree with people of her same political party. However, if a
justice is the only Republican or Democrat on a specific court, she
will necessarily oppose opposite party judges (due to the lack of
any co-partisans). While partisanship is far from a completely
reliable measure, previous scholars have found that justices that
deviate from their partisan roots are vastly the exception, not the
rule.24 In order to account for this possible bias, the total number
of majority opinions by other justices of the same party is divided
by the total (overall) number of majority opinions written by the
court.
Independence is then defined as the percent of disagreements
with co-partisans (i.e. how often the justice dissents against
members of their own party) over the percent of co-partisan
majority opinions (i.e. how many of the majority opinions are
written by co-partisans).25 The scale is calibrated so that a more
negative score corresponds to a justice who writes opposing
opinions against opposite-party justices more frequently than the
background pool of majority opinions authored by opposite-party
justices. On the other hand, a more positive score corresponds to
an authoring justice who writes opposing opinions less frequently
against opposite-party justices compared with the background
pool of opinions (and thus more frequently against co-partisans).
Generally, Choi, Gulati and Posner have viewed a more positive
23. See Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid?, supra note 5, at 50; Choi et al.,
Professionals or Politicians?, supra note 5; Choi et al., Judicial Evaluations,
supra note 4, at 1323.
24. See, e.g., Jeffrey Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of the
U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. OF POL. 812, 822 (1995) ("[O]ur
results - especially for the Eisenhower-Bush appointees - point to [ideology's]
strong predictive power, at least for aggregated votes in civil liberties and
economic cases.").
25. See Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid?, supra note 5, at 50; Choi et al.,
Professionals or Politicians?, supra note 5: Choi et al., Judicial Evaluations,
supra note 4, at 1323.
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score as indicative of a more independent justice.26  Other
scholarship has suggested that disagreement among judges is a
negative- a sign of disagreeability or cantankerousness.
In the context of the Rhode Island Supreme Court selection
method change, one might expect that a justice selected based on
merit and not based on a heavily partisan selection process would
be less likely to be swayed by partisan alignments on the Court.
Hypothesis 5: Those Justices Selected Through the Merit Process
will be more Independent than Those Selected by the Grand
Committee.
Overall, these five hypotheses and their subparts suggest that
the landscape of measuring judicial quality is wide, diverse, and
often difficult to quantify. Here, I attempt to use existing
measures and specific hypotheses to examine the effect of
selection change on judicial behavior. The presentation of findings
will proceed in the order of the hypotheses.
II. FINDINGS
1. Production
Looking first at the number of published cases for each
justice, the justices in the pre-merit period published at a higher
rate than those in the post-merit period. Specifically, the earlier
group of justices published an average of 28.7 cases per year per
justice, while the middle group of justices published 18.2 cases per
year, and the later group of justices published an average of 21.7
cases per year per justice (See Figure 1). The difference between
the pre-merit court and either the hybrid (Pr(T > t) = 0.0231) or
the post-merit (Pr(T > t) = 0.0004) courts is statistically
significant. As Figure 1 also shows, overall, there is little
variation between the justices on each Court.
26. Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid?, supra note 5, at 50; Choi et al.,
Professionals or Politicians?, supra note 5; Choi et al., Judicial Evaluations,
supra note 4, at 1323.
2010] 713
714 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:705
30.0 29.0
23.0
1 120 .3 14.7 1 1 0 1
Fig. 1: Average Number of Cases Published
(PerYear) Per Judge
35.0 -
30,030.327.7
26.3
25.0
15.0
100
5,0
0.0
This suggests that there is preliminary evidence that Hypothesis
lb is correct; justices selected by the merit system seem to be
publishing at a lower rate than those selected by the Grand
Committee. One interesting finding is that Weisberger, the one
pre-merit Justice on the hybrid court, had a much lower
publication rate in 1998-2000 than he did in 1989 to 1991,
suggesting that either: (1) his production fell as he approached
retirement; or (2) there were court-level changes in the
expectation of publication or performance post-merit.
2. Citations
The next substantial measure that is used to measure the
quality of judicial performance is the rate at which judge's
22.3 N 7
1. 210 21.7
I 7 
2 0
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opinions are cited by other courts. 27 Presented here are three
different citation count measures: (1) citations from outside Rhode
Island's federal district; (2) citations from outside Rhode Island;
and (3) secondary citations.
Looking first at the average rate of citation by courts outside
Rhode Island's district, we see that earlier justices were cited at a
higher rate than justices serving in 2005-2007 (See Figure 2).
Keep in mind that citation counts for both sets of justices were
only gathered for the two years immediately following the time
span. For the cases from 1989 to 1991, citations through January
1, 1993 were collected; for the later cases, citations through
January 1, 2009 were collected. Therefore, there should not be
any bias towards the earlier cases, as the term of the citations is
equal. However, as Figure 2 shows, opinions written by the
earlier Court are cited more often than opinions written by the
later Court. This difference is not statistically significant (Pr(T >
t) = 0.0823). There are also no significant differences in the
citation rates between justices on each Court. This data
demonstrates that Hypothesis 2 is incorrect - those justices
chosen by the merit system are not more likely to be cited by
courts outside of Rhode Island's district.
27. See Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid?, supra note 5, at 50; Choi et al.,
Judicial Evaluations, supra note 4, at 272; Choi et al., Professionals or
Politicians?, supra note 5, at 3; Landes et al., supra note 14, at 272.
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Fig. 2: Average Number of Citations (per
opinion) from Courts Outside Federal District
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Looking at a larger pool of citations - those citations from
courts outside of Rhode Island - similar patterns emerge. As
Figure 3 shows, the average out of state citation rate for the
earlier Court is slightly less than three times that of the later
Court. The difference in average out of state citation rates
between the pre-merit and post-merit Courts is statistically
significant (Pr(T > t) = 0.0000). The differences between the
widely varying rate of citation among the justices on the 1989-
1991 Court is just outside the standard cut-off for significance
(Prob > F = 0.1095). This is interesting given the consistency of
citation rates among the justices on the 2005-2007 court.
Generally, the data on out of district citations demonstrates that
Hypothesis 2 is incorrect, thus forcing me to accept the null that
merit selection does not lead to more influential justices. Further
evidence for the null is that the sole Justice (Weisberger)
remaining from the pre-merit Court on the hybrid Court had the
highest average rate of out of state citations.
2010]
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opinion) from Courts Outside State
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While citation counts by other courts are a good measure of
the view that other judges have about a justice or court's ability to
make law, looking at citations by law reviews serves to identify
the perception of the Court among academics and those that study
the law.28 Looking at the rate of secondary citations, there are
very few differences between the earlier and later Courts. In fact,
as Figure 4 shows, the early and late Courts have an almost
identical overall average rate of secondary source citations, a
difference that is unsurprisingly insignificant.
28. See Landes et al., supra note 13 (analyzing judicial opinions' citations
to other courts).
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Fig. 4: Average (per opinion) Law Review
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The hybrid Court has a slightly higher rate of secondary citations,
but the difference is, again, insignificant. Justices Lederberg and
Goldberg have, by far, the highest average number of secondary
citations. These results, again, demonstrate the inaccuracy of
Hypothesis 2; there is no evidence in the data that justices
selected by the merit system are cited more by law reviews than
justices selected by the Grand Committee.
3. Page Length
One remarkable difference between the judicial performance
in the pre-merit selection time and the hybrid and post merit
selection period is the length of opinions by the justices of the
D.78
0.22
0.58
I
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Rhode Island Supreme Court. Specifically, there are dramatic
differences between the average length of opinions for the pre-
merit and post-merit periods. As Figure 5 shows, the average
length of opinions in the pre-merit period was 4.1 pages, with
Justices Murray, Weisberger and Fay at the high end, publishing
an average opinion length of 4.3 pages, and Justice Kelleher at the
low end, publishing an average length of 3.8 pages. Looking at the
hybrid Court, there is a small increase in the average length of
opinions, with Justice Flanders (7 pages per opinion) and Justice
Boucier (6.4 pages per opinion) at the upper end of opinion length.
Finally, turning to the post-merit Court, Figure 5 demonstrates a
dramatic increase in the average page length, rising to an overall
average of 9.8 pages per opinion. On this Court, Justice Williams
is on the lower end, with 8.6 pages per opinion (or twice the
longest average of the pre-change court), and Justice Suttell is the
most expansive, with 10.6 pages per opinion. While the difference
between the earlier term and the later term is statistically
significant (Pr(T < t) = 0.0000), as is the difference between the
middle term and the later term, the difference between the early
and middle term is not statistically significant.
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Fig. 5: Average Number of Pages (per opinion)
Per Judge
10.2 10.1
7.0
I . 5 4 5 5 5 .5 6 .
4.3 4.3 4.3 As 1 I1 I
topA4~&
There are no statistically significant differences between the
justices on each Court. A similar pattern emerges when we look
at the total number of pages written by each justice. As with the
average number of pages, the later Court has written dramatically
more pages of opinions than the earlier Court. Specifically, as
displayed in Figure 6, the earlier Court has an average of 357.6
pages per justice, a high of 391 pages, and a low of 299 pages.
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The 1998-2000 Court has an average of 327.4 pages, with a high of
486 (by Justice Flanders) and a low of 263. The 2005-2007 Court
has an average of 637.2 pages per judge, a low of 571, and a high
of 669. As with the average length, the difference in total pages
between the early or middle Courts and the later Court is
statistically significant (Pr(T < t) = 0.0000), but there are no
statistically significant differences between the early and middle
Courts, or between each Court's justices' total pages.
Fig. 6: Total Number of Pages Written per
Judge
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4. Subject Area
Turning next to the subject areas that justices publish in most
often, Figure 7 shows that the overall patterns of subject areas
have changed very little from 1989 to 2007. Overall, the rate of
criminal cases as the subject matter of published opinions is on
the rise in the Rhode Island Supreme Court, while cases relating
to labor disputes are in decline.
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Looking closely at the top subject areas, these subject areas
account for 75% of cases in the earlier term, 84% of the middle
term, and 87% of cases in the later term. It is also worth noting
that the top subject areas of published cases change very little
from 1989 to 2007. For example, criminal is the most common
subject area for both sets of years, although there are far more
criminal cases published in the later term (40% of total cases)
compared to the middle term (34% of cases) and the earlier term
(27% of cases). Furthermore, as Figures 8, 9, and 10 demonstrate,
the top subject areas do not change. The 1989-1991 court also
published heavily in private law (16% of total cases), property
(12% of total cases), labor (11% of total cases) and tort (9% of total
cases).
724 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:705
Looking at the middle term, the same five subject areas appear in
the top five subject areas, including criminal, labor, private law,
property, and torts. Compared to the early term, the middle term
published more on torts (19%) and criminal (34%), and less on
labor (9%) and private law (11%).
In the later term, criminal law (40%), torts (15%), property (14%),
private law (12%) and labor (6%) are also the most common
subject areas, although their order of frequency changes. These
results suggest that while there may be some small changes in the
subject matter of cases published, the justices on the Rhode Island
Supreme Court hear and write about a stable group of subject
areas.
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5. Independence
As we turn next to an evaluation of the average rates of
independence for the three Courts, it is important to note that
Rhode Island has ranked very high on the average rate of
independence by previous studieS29 with an average rate of
independence of 0.19 in 1998 to 2000 (See Figure 11). Earlier, I
hypothesized that the Courts where justices are selected by the
merit system will be more independent than those that are
selected by the previous system. However, as Figure 12 shows,
there is little evidence that the Court grew more independent with
29. See Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians?, supra note 5.
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the change in measures. In fact, the hybrid Court has the highest
level of independence of all the courts examined, followed by the
pre-merit Court, with the post-merit Court falling at the tail end
(See Figure 11). Despite the lower level of independence for the
2005 to 2007 Court, it is important to put these rates of
independence in context; Choi, Gulati and Posner's 2009 research
found that the average rate of independence for all the state high
courts combined was less than -0.03.30 As such, the lowest rate of
independence (0.12) is still much higher than the overall average
rate of independence (See Figure 11).31
Fig. 11: Average Rate of Independence
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30. See Choi et al., Judicial Evaluations, supra note 4, at 1325.
31. See id.
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Examining the data within the context of Hypothesis 5, there is
little evidence in support of the theory that merit selection results
in higher levels of independence.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this attempt to examine the effects of the
change in selection method through a standard empirical matrix
finds that the change to a traditional merit -selection system has
had very few effects on traditional measures of judicial quality. In
Rhode Island, there has been a decline in the rate of opinion
publication and in the rate of citation to opinions written by the
state Supreme Court justices (See Figures 1, 2, and 3). While
opinions have gotten longer (resulting both an increase in the
average length of published opinions and the total number of
pages written; see Figures 5 and 6), there has not been a
significant effect on either the subject areas that the justices
choose to publish in, or the rate of independence (See Figures 7, 8,
9, 10, and 11).
Overall, these results can be interpreted in two ways. First,
they might suggest that the change in selection process has not
dramatically improved the performance of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court in areas where we have established measures. It
may be that, when collegiality, fairness, and efficiency are
examined, the post-change courts are demonstrably better.
However, there is little evidence that the method of selection
change has positively affected the production, influence, or
independence of the court. Second, it may be that these results
are simply evidence that the human-nature focused task of
judging is difficult to measure. Looking at citations from an
outside court is an excellent example: the high average citations
from outside courts in the earlier court was largely the product of
a single justice (Weisberger) who is very well regarded and cited to
frequently by judges in other districts (See Figure 3). The
independence scores can be similarly examined; the process by
which a judge's party is identified is far from foolproof. If the
process of determining a justice's party' is error-ridden, this
introduces a level of error into the measurement itself. In
addition, in a state like Rhode Island, where Democrat and
Republican are often imprecise labels that do not correspond to
ideology, using a measure based on partisan may be a fool's
errand.
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The general lessons from the data presented here are this:
from examining the most common subject areas, it does not
appear that the substance of cases appearing before the Court has
changed much over the last twenty years. The data presented on
citation counts and publication rates suggest that the ranking a
Court enjoys on these measures of quality can be highly
influenced by the actions of a single or a few justices. Finally, a
very high independence score can speak to several findings; first,
that justices in Rhode Island may be very independent. Second, it
is possible that the measure is innately flawed, as it relies on a
piece of data - partisanship - that is either flawed in collection (as
a consistent measure of partisanship is difficult to find) or useless
in a context like Rhode Island where partisanship is
uncompetitive and does not necessarily correspond to ideology. 32
Third, measures like independence may be best interpreted in the
context of a large number of states. All together, the data
presented in this article offers many clues but few answers as to
the effect of the change in selection method on the quality of
judging in Rhode Island's court of last resort.
32. See, e.g., Samuel C. Patterson and Gregory A. Caldeira, The Etiology
of Partisan Competition, 78 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 691 (1984).
